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Abstract: Pathogens represent a significant threat to human health leading to the emergence of 12 
strategies designed to help manage their negative impact. We examined how spiritual beliefs 13 
developed to explain and predict the devastating effects of pathogens and spread of infectious 14 
disease. Analysis of existing data in Studies 1 and 2 suggests that moral vitalism (beliefs about 15 
spiritual forces of evil) is higher in geographical regions characterized by historical higher levels 16 
of pathogens. Furthermore, drawing on a sample of 3,140 participants from 28 countries in Study 17 
3, we found that historical higher levels of pathogens were associated with stronger endorsement 18 
of moral vitalistic beliefs. Furthermore, endorsement of moral vitalistic beliefs statistically 19 
mediated the previously reported relationship between pathogen prevalence and conservative 20 
ideologies, suggesting these beliefs reinforce behavioral strategies which function to prevent 21 
infection. We conclude that moral vitalism may be adaptive: by emphasizing concerns over 22 
contagion, it provided an explanatory model that enabled human groups to reduce rates of 23 
contagious disease.     24 
 25 
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Explaining illness with evil: Pathogen prevalence fosters moral vitalism  28 
Throughout human history, pathogens have posed a persistent threat to the survival and 29 
growth of humans. To mitigate this threat, humans may have developed a suite of psychological 30 
responses known as a “behavioral immune system” that protects against the spread of infectious 31 
disease (e.g., Fincher & Thornhill, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2011; Mortensen, Becker, Ackerman, 32 
Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2010; Murray, & Schaller, 2010, 2012; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; 33 
Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003; Schaller & Murray, 2008; Schaller & Park, 2011). While prior 34 
work has assumed detection mechanisms capable of identifying pathogen threats and activating 35 
the behavioral immune system (e.g., Schaller & Park, 2011), human threat detection is enhanced 36 
in the presence of a theory (lay or scientific) on which to base prediction and response. Here, we 37 
propose that “moral vitalism” beliefs—beliefs in contagious and agentic spiritual forces of evil—38 
provided a lay theoretic model of the origin and spread of disease amongst pre-germ-theory 39 
societies. Furthermore, we suggest that moral vitalism is associated with key elements of the 40 
behavioral immune system, reinforcing avoidance of pathogen cues in the immediate 41 
environment, and bolstering adherence to traditional norms and ethnocentrism. Moral vitalism 42 
may have emerged as humans tried to explain the spread of disease and persisted because it 43 
conferred an adaptive advantage to groups who were threatened by pathogens. 44 
Moral Vitalism and Explanations for Infectious Disease 45 
People often posit the existence of supernatural “forces” or “spirits” to explain events that 46 
do not have a clear biological or psychological explanation—a tendency that is especially acute 47 
for harmful events (Cashmore, 2010; Gray & Wegner, 2010; Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Kirschner, 48 
Gerhart, & Mitchison, 2000). We suggest that disease outbreaks represented such events 49 
amongst pre-germ-theory societies. In these groups, people needed a theory for predicting, and 50 
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from which they could attempt to control, the spread of disease. A belief in contagious and 51 
contaminating evil forces—which we label “moral vitalism”—would have provided a 52 
functionally equivalent framework for prediction and management, identifying both the infection 53 
and transmission profile of pathogens.  54 
Buttressing this possibility is the observation that cultures vary widely in their lay 55 
explanations for disease and suffering (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), including a 56 
tendency to explain and respond to disease by drawing on a belief in moralistic supernatural 57 
forces; a tendency that has been observed across Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America 58 
(Murdock, 1980; Park, 1992; a case in point is the escalation of witch-hunts in response to the 59 
Black Death). Furthermore, spiritual responses to physical illness and disease remain popular in 60 
modern societies (e.g., faith healing, spiritual healing), where health complaints are sometimes 61 
attributed to the will of God or the work of the Devil (Hamdy, 2009; Legare & Gelman, 2008) 62 
thus illustrating their attractiveness as intuitive explanations.  63 
The concept of moral vitalism (Bastian et al., 2015), draws on previous work 64 
documenting theories of vital forces, energies, power, “soul-stuff,” or spirits in many traditional 65 
belief systems (Atran et al., 2002; Frazer, 1890/1959; Mauss, 1902/1972; Tylor, 1871/1974), in 66 
early scientific and psychological theorizing (Bechtel & Richardson, 1998; Jung, 1917/1983), in 67 
children’s understanding of biology (Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Morris, Taplin, & Gelman, 2000), 68 
in adult thinking about natural and psychological events (Cashmore, 2010; Lindeman & Saher, 69 
2007), and in reasoning about interpersonal contagion or transmission (Douglas, 1966; 70 
Nemeroff, 1995; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994, 2000; Rozin & Nemeroff, 1990). A belief in moral 71 
vitalism has been associated with concerns that people are vulnerable to possession (infection) 72 
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by evil forces, and that these forces are interpersonally contagious (transmission; Bastian et al., 73 
2015).  74 
By providing a framework for predicting the spread of infectious disease, moral vitalism 75 
would also have facilitated (or at least cognitively justified) behavioral strategies designed to 76 
limit infection. We argue that moral vitalistic beliefs may have contributed to these antipathogen 77 
psychological tendencies in two ways. First, moral vitalism would have reinforced evolved 78 
tendencies to avoid pathogen cues in the immediate environment (Oaten et al., 2009; Schaller & 79 
Park, 2011; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). This is consistent with evidence showing 80 
that endorsement of moral vitalism is associated with heightened disgust sensitivity and 81 
avoidance of indirect contact with suspicious strangers (Bastian et al., 2015; see also Nemeroff, 82 
1995; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). Second, moral vitalism would have reinforced the emergence 83 
of conservative ideologies within high pathogen environments (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & 84 
Schaller, 2008; Murray, Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; van Leeuwen, 85 
Park, Koenig, & Graham, 2012). Conservatism has been linked to adherence to culturally 86 
evolved norms and rituals which neutralize local pathogen threats (e.g., food preparation norms; 87 
Tybur et al., 2016) and ethnocentrism which encourages behavioral avoidance of strangers, 88 
limiting exposure to novel pathogens for which one’s immune system resistance is low (e.g., 89 
Fincher et al., 2008; Murray & Schaller, 2012; Murray et al., 2013; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; 90 
van Leeuwen et al., 2012; although see Bromham, Hua, Cardillo, Schneemannm, & Greenhill, 91 
2018; Hadley & Hruschka, 2017; Petersen, 2017). This is consistent with prior work showing 92 
that endorsement of moral vitalism is associated with conservative attitudes, fundamentalist 93 
thinking, and religiosity (Bastian et al., 2015). 94 
 95 
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The Current Studies 96 
The above reasoning suggests three key predictions. Our first and main prediction is that 97 
moral vitalistic beliefs should be especially evident in contexts characterized by higher historical 98 
pathogen prevalence. That is, given their utility in limiting the spread of infection, such beliefs 99 
should flourish and become entrenched under conditions of high pathogen prevalence. We tested 100 
this prediction using both archival data (Studies 1 and 2) and our own multi-national survey 101 
(Study 3). Across all three studies we examined the link between belief in evil forces (Study 1 – 102 
evil eye beliefs, Witchcraft; Study 2 – belief in the Devil; Study 3 – belief in evil forces) and 103 
geographical variation in historical pathogen prevalence. Our second prediction is that because 104 
moral vitalism provides a functional framework for managing the spread of disease, it should be 105 
associated with antipathogen psychological tendencies linked to the behavioral immune system. 106 
We tested this prediction in Study 3 by examining the relationship between moral vitalism and 107 
conservative attitudes and group-binding moralities. Our third prediction is that if moral vitalism 108 
represents the more proximal influence of pathogen threat on human cognition and culture, then 109 
it should help to explain the previously reported relationships between pathogen prevalence and 110 
antipathogen psychological tendencies linked to the behavioral immune system. We explored 111 
this prediction in Study 3 by asking if moral vitalism statistically mediated the link between 112 
pathogen prevalence and conservative attitudes as well as group-binding moralities.  113 
Study 1: Evil Eye Belief 114 
We began with the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). This includes an index of 115 
the existence of the evil eye belief within various cultural contexts. The evil eye refers to another 116 
person who casts a curse, leading to misfortune or injury, through a malevolent glare. The SCCS 117 
also includes an index of the extent to which people in a particular culture ascribe any 118 
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impairment of health to the existence of Witchcraft. The most common strategy witches are 119 
believed to rely on when causing impairment is the evil eye, highlighting conceptual 120 
convergence between these two concepts of illness causation (Murdock, 1980). We focused on 121 
these two beliefs as they both entail the idea that evil forces can be contagious and 122 
contaminating, analogous to the transfer of pathogens, and in a way that is structurally similar to 123 
a belief in moral vitalism (see Bastian et al., 2015; see also Gershman, 2015; and Quinlan & 124 
Quinlan, 2007 for alternative accounts). For instance, a belief in the evil eye suggests the 125 
possibility of interpersonal transmission of evil and the practice of Witchcraft explicitly refers to 126 
the channeling of evil spirits, both of which have the capacity to cause harm. In line with our 127 
main prediction, we examined whether a belief in the evil eye and Witchcraft was more apparent 128 
in contexts characterized by higher levels of historical pathogen prevalence. 129 
Materials and Methods 130 
Archival Data 131 
 The SCCS is a representative sample of the world’s known and well described cultures, 132 
each pinpointed to the smallest identifiable subgroup of the specific society at the time it was 133 
constructed (Murdock & White, 1969). The SCCS includes observational data for 186 distinct 134 
cultures spanning a wide range of diverse societies worldwide (covering preindustrial societies to 135 
technologically advanced agricultural societies) and documented at a time of maximum cultural 136 
independence with the explicit aim of overcoming the problem of co-influence between cultures 137 
(commonly referred to as Galton’s problem).  138 
Evil eye belief. This was coded for in the SCCS by Roberts (1976; see also Gershman, 139 
2015) on a scale from 1 (incontrovertibly absent) to 8 (incontrovertibly present).  140 
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Witchcraft. This explanation attributed illness to the suspected voluntary or involuntary 141 
aggressive action of a member of a special class of human beings believed to be endowed with a 142 
special power and propensity for evil (1 = absence of such a cause, 2 = minor or relatively 143 
unimportant cause, 3 = an important auxiliary cause, 4 = predominant cause recognised by the 144 
society; Murdock, 1980). 145 
Historical pathogen prevalence. An index of historical pathogen prevalence for the 186 146 
SCCS cultures has been developed by Cashdan (2014). A combined index uses the mean of z-147 
scores for the historical prevalence of 10 pathogens (malaria, dengue, filariae, typhus, 148 
trypanosomes, leishmanias, schistosomes, and plague, leprosy and spirochetes) derived from 149 
historical sources, chiefly global maps published in the mid-twentieth century. 150 
Control variables. We included a number of control variables coded in the SCCS which 151 
allowed us to rule out the possibility that our observed relationship was an artefact of religious 152 
belief, extent of internal or external conflict, frequency of adverse events such as famine, 153 
resource uncertainty, or wealth inequality. We also controlled for explanations for health 154 
impairment, other than Witchcraft, as coded by Murdock (1980). See supplementary materials 155 
for a full discussion of control variables. 156 
Results 157 
Zero-order correlations indicate that the evil eye belief is significantly and positively 158 
correlated with historical pathogen prevalence, r(186) = .24, p = .001, as is a reliance on 159 
witchcraft as an explanation for illness, r(131) = .57, p < .001 (see Table S1 for all correlations 160 
including control variables). Given extensive missing data across all control variables, to 161 
maintain power we analysed each separately to maintain a reasonable sample size. Multiple 162 
regression analyses revealed the relationship between historical pathogen prevalence and evil eye 163 
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beliefs (all ps < .030) and witchcraft remained significant (all ps < .038) in all cases (see Table 164 
S2 and S3 for full reporting).  165 
 166 
Study 2: Belief in the Devil 167 
The findings from the SCCS data set revealed that in contexts where historical pathogen 168 
prevalence was high, so too was the tendency for these cultures to endorse a belief in the 169 
existence of contagious and contaminating evil forces which can cause illness. Next, we 170 
examined data from the World Values Survey (WVS) in which respondents were asked whether 171 
they believed in the Devil (0 = no, 1 = yes; a binary outcome variable which be understood as a 172 
proportion). We used Wave 3 survey data because more cross-national data were available on 173 
this question compared to all other waves. A belief in the Devil entails the existence of a specific 174 
evil force in the world and is therefore relevant to moral vitalism. We therefore predicted this 175 
belief would be higher in countries which historical higher levels of pathogens.  176 
Materials and Methods 177 
Archival Data 178 
We used survey data from Wave 3 (conducted from 1995 to 1998) of the WVS in which 179 
60,454 respondents (Mage = 40.89, SD=15.91, 51.6% female) from 50 countries were asked 180 
whether they believed in the Devil (0 = no, 1 = yes). Four countries had missing data on the 181 
country-level predictors, therefore, leaving a maximum sample size of 58,076 at Level 1 and 46 182 
at Level 2 for the multilevel analyses.  183 
Socio-Demographic Covariates 184 
 The following socio-demographic variables were included as individual-level covariates: 185 
age, gender (recoded: 0 = male, 1 = female), level of education (recoded: 1 = lower, 2 = middle, 186 
3 = upper), social class (recoded: 1 = lower class, 5 = upper class), religiosity (recoded: 1 = 187 
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religion not at all important in life, 4 = religion very important in life), political orientation (1 = 188 
left, 10 = right), and subjective health (1 = very poor, 5 = very good).  189 
Country-Level Variables 190 
Historical pathogen prevalence. Historical pathogen prevalence estimates were 191 
obtained from Murray and Schaller (2010) who compiled an index incorporating nine distinct 192 
diseases (leishmanias, schistosomes, trypanosomes, leprosy, malaria, typhus, filariae, dengue, 193 
and tuberculosis) derived from epidemiological atlases mapping the prevalence of each disease 194 
in each region. 195 
Country-level control variables. 196 
Human development index. We argue that belief in evil forces may be relied on when 197 
more scientific explanations are not available, suggesting that the level of development may be 198 
important. Therefore, we obtained country scores on the Human Development Index (HDI; 199 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries) which is composed of national income, education and life 200 
expectancy (expressed as a value between 0 and 1). We averaged the country scores from 1990 to 201 
2000 so that the HDI data corresponds to the time when the WVS data were gathered1,2.  202 
Corruption. We reasoned that people might rely on a belief in evil forces to explain 203 
unfair and unethical behaviour. If so, such beliefs should be especially common in contexts 204 
wherein corruption is high. To this end, we drew on the Corruption Perception Index 205 
(Transparency International, 2015) ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 206 
Democracy. We argue that believing in evil forces provides a sense of prediction and 207 
control, something that might also be relevant in non-democratic contexts wherein citizens feel 208 
they have little control. To test this, we used an index of Democracy, drawing on data from The 209 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2015). This is a single score based on five 210 
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categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 211 
political participation; and political culture. 212 
 Peace. Believing in evil forces might also be relied on to explain contexts characterised 213 
by intergroup conflict. As such, we drew on a measure of a country´s peacefulness, using data 214 
from the Global Peace Index (GPI) Report from 2013 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2013). 215 
The index assesses the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic and 216 
international conflict, and the degree of militarization. The index was recoded so that higher 217 
scores reflect more peacefulness. 218 
Analytic Strategy 219 
We used Multi-Level Modelling (MLM) which allowed us to examine the effect of 220 
pathogen prevalence on belief in the Devil while controlling for relevant covariates at both the 221 
individual and country-level. Given that the criterion variable is binary, we analyzed the data 222 
with multilevel logistic regression specifying a Bernoulli distribution and restricted penalized 223 
quasi-likelihood estimation in HLM 7 (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2004). We used grand-mean 224 
centering for all individual- and country-level predictors which is most appropriate when the 225 
focus of interest is on examining the predictive power of a Level 2 variable while controlling for 226 
Level 1 covariates (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).     227 
Results 228 
Correlating pathogen prevalence with the proportion of individuals believing in the Devil 229 
in each country shows that there is a significant association between the two variables, r(46) = 230 
.52, p < .001 (see also Figure S1). Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel logistic regression 231 
analyses predicting belief in the Devil. Analysing a random-intercept model with no explanatory 232 
variables (Model 0) yielded an intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.37 meaning that 37% 233 
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of the total variance in the criterion variable is due to differences between countries. In Model 1 234 
we entered all individual-level variables as fixed effects and found that age, gender, religiosity, 235 
conservative political orientation, education, social class and subjective health were significant 236 
predictors of belief in the Devil.  237 
We then tested the country-level predictors and found that pathogen prevalence (Model 238 
2) was a significant predictor of belief in the Devil when controlling for socio-demographics. In 239 
Model 3, we accounted for the possibility that individual-level associations vary across countries 240 
by including random slopes into the model and found that it did not affect the predictive power 241 
of Pathogen Prevalence, B = 0.553, Odds Ratio = 1.738, p = .011 (see Table 1). We proceeded 242 
controlling for each country-level covariate at once because of the relatively small country-level 243 
sample size (when all country-level predictors were entered simultaneously, none were 244 
significant predictors; see Table S4, model 6). The effect of historical pathogen prevalence on 245 
belief in the Devil remained significant when controlling for the Corruption Index (p = .022) and 246 
the Democracy Index (p = .012) but became marginal when controlling for the Peace Index (p = 247 
.086) and the HDI (p = .094)3. None of the country-level controls were themselves significant 248 
predictors: Corruption Index (p = .578), Democracy Index (p = .597), Peace Index (p = .707), 249 
and HDI (p = .778). The full results are reported in the Supplementary Materials (Table S4).   250 
Study 3: Moral Vitalism 251 
As a direct test of our theory, we conducted a large multi-national survey incorporating a 252 
measure of moral vitalism (see Bastian et al., 2015), a construct that specifically assesses belief 253 
in the existence of spiritual forces of good and evil (e.g., “There are underlying forces of good 254 
and evil in this world”). As noted above, a belief in moral vitalism has been associated with 255 
concerns that people are vulnerable to possession by evil forces and that these forces are 256 
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interpersonally contagious (Bastian et al., 2015). A belief in moral vitalism is therefore sensitive 257 
to the avenues through which pathogens are known to cause harm to humans – through infection 258 
and interpersonal transmission – and offers a functionally equivalent theory of pathogens effects 259 
on human health to that provided by modern day germ theories.  260 
In this study we also sought to provide additional evidence for our claim that moral 261 
vitalistic beliefs function to manage the spread of infection. As noted, prior work has revealed 262 
that conservative attitudes and group-binding moralities emerged within high pathogen 263 
environments. In line with our second prediction, we examined associations between moral 264 
vitalistic beliefs and these antipathogen psychological tendencies, basing our prediction on 265 
previous work showing a relationship between moral vitalism and conservative attitudes, 266 
fundamentalist thinking, and religiosity (Bastian et al., 2015). 267 
Our reasoning also suggests that moral vitalism may represent a more proximal influence 268 
of pathogen threat on human cognition and culture and therefore should help to explain the 269 
previously reported relationships between pathogen prevalence and these psychological 270 
tendencies linked to the behavioral immune system. In line with this prediction, we explored 271 
whether moral vitalism statistically mediated any relationship between historical pathogen 272 
prevalence and conservative values and a group-binding morality. 273 
Materials and Methods 274 
Participants and Procedure 275 
A total of 3,202 university students residing in 28 countries (North and South America, 276 
Europe, Asia, and Australasia) participated in this study for course credit. Participants were only 277 
included in the analyses if they were nationals from the respective countries or if they had lived 278 
in the country for more than 10 years leaving an effective sample size of 3,131. The average age 279 
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of the total sample was 22.61 years (SD = 6.27) and 64.4% of all participants were female. An 280 
overview of sample characteristics for each country is presented in Table S6 (see Supplementary 281 
Materials). Respondents who took part in the study either received course credits or 282 
reimbursement. All samples were collected in line with relevant ethical protocols and informed 283 
consent procedures for each country. 284 
Measures 285 
Participants responded to a larger questionnaire and only the measures relevant for the 286 
present study are described here. The questionnaire was developed in English and established 287 
translations of scales were used whenever possible. All other measures were translated into the 288 
respective language of the country by bilinguals and the accuracy of the translation was verified 289 
through back-translations or a committee approach.  290 
Individual-level variables 291 
Moral vitalism. Bastian et al.’s (2015) measure of moral vitalism served as our dependent 292 
variable. It features five items assessing the belief in real, agentic forces of good and evil (e.g., 293 
“There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world”, “Good and evil are aspects of the 294 
natural world”) on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 295 
agree). Cronbach´s alphas based on standardised items were satisfactory across countries (M = 296 
.75, range: .63 to .85). Tests of approximate measurement invariance across countries (see 297 
Rudnev, Vauclair, Bastian et al., 2019) supported only a weaker form of measurement invariance 298 
(partial metric invariance). However, dropping one of the items yielded acceptable fit indices for 299 
a partial scalar model (strong form of measurement invariance; see Rudnev, Vauclair, Bastian et 300 
al, 2019). Re-running the main model with the 4-item measure, yielded virtually the same results 301 
as for the 5-item measure (except for the non-significant main effect of gender and the non-302 
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significant random slope of religiosity with the 4-item measure, see Table S7 in Supplementary 303 
Materials).  304 
Antipathogen psychological tendencies. We adopted two measures designed to tap 305 
antipathogen psychological tendencies, each of which has been linked to historical pathogen 306 
prevalence in past work (e.g., Murray & Schaller, 2012; Murray et al., 2013; van Leeuwen et al., 307 
2012). Participants completed 14 Moral Relevance Items developed by Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 308 
2009) assessing the three moral binding foundations: Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, 309 
Purity/sanctity (1 = never relevant to 6 = always relevant). Cronbach´s alphas based on 310 
standardized items were satisfactory across countries (M = .84, range: .76 to .91). We used the 311 
Short Schwartz´s Value Survey (SSVS) to assess individuals´ endorsement of conservative 312 
values (e.g., honoring elders). We employed Lindeman and Verkasalo´s (2005) equation to 313 
obtain individuals´ scores on the main value dimension conservation vs. openness-to-change.  314 
Control variables 315 
 Given that moral vitalism is associated with religion and political conservatism (see 316 
Bastian et al., 2015) and that both of these variables have been linked to historical pathogen 317 
prevalence (e.g, Fincher & Thornhill, 2008) we sought to control for whether people indicated 318 
following a religion and their political orientation. 319 
Religion.  Participants were asked whether they followed a religion (0 = no and 1 = yes). 320 
Political orientation. Participants completed a measure of political orientation towards 321 
social issues (“Please indicate your political beliefs from left/liberal to right/conservative on 322 
social issues; e.g., immigration, homosexual marriage, abortion”) (1 = Left/Liberal; 7 = 323 
Right/Conservative) and economic issues (“Please indicate your political beliefs from left/liberal 324 
to right/conservative on economic issues; e.g., social welfare, government spending, tax cuts”) (1 325 
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= Left/Liberal; 7 = Right/Conservative). Political orientation items were significantly correlated 326 
in all countries, except in China (r = .06, p = .475) and so were kept separate in the analyses. 327 
Country-level variables 328 
Historical pathogen prevalence. We drew on the same existing data for historical 329 
pathogen prevalence estimates from Murray and Schaller (2010) as in Study 2 above. 330 
Control variables. The same variables as in Study 2 were used to control for the socio-331 
political and economic context of a country: the HDI (United Nations Development Programme, 332 
2011), the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2015), the Democracy 333 
Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015), and the GPI (Institute for Economics and Peace, 334 
2013).  335 
Analytic Strategy 336 
We employed MLM analysis as in Study 2 to test the link between pathogen prevalence 337 
and moral vitalism. This time, however, we used linear multilevel regression (with restricted 338 
maximum likelihood estimation) in HLM 7 (Bryk & Raudenbush, 2004), because the dependent 339 
variable was continuous. We grand-mean centered all individual- and country-level predictors 340 
for the same reasons as the ones mentioned in Study 2.  341 
To test the mediation hypotheses, we employed a 2-1-1 multilevel mediation model 342 
within the structural equation paradigm (MSEM) in Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). 343 
This means that the independent variable (Xj) is assessed at level-2, both the mediator (Mij) and 344 
the dependent variables are measured at level-1 (Yij). In other words, we expected that historical 345 
disease prevalence as a level-2 antecedent influences the level-1 mediator (moral vitalism) which 346 
then affects the level-1 outcome variables (conservative values or moral binding foundations). 347 
See supplementary materials for a longer discussion of the statistical approach employed. 348 
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Results 349 
Descriptive country-level statistics of all variables and sample characteristics are shown 350 
in the Supplementary Materials (Table S6). Pathogen prevalence correlated with moral vitalism 351 
at r(27) = .50, p = .007 therefore sharing 24.70% of its variance. Figure 1 illustrates the link 352 
between pathogen prevalence and moral vitalism across all 28 countries.  353 
Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel regression analyses explaining beliefs in moral 354 
vitalism. Analyzing a random-intercept model with no explanatory variables yielded an intra-355 
class correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.24 (Model 0). In Model 1 we entered all individual-level 356 
variables as fixed effects and found that gender, religion and conservative political orientation 357 
were significant predictors of moral vitalism. We then tested pathogen prevalence (Model 2) as a 358 
country-level predictor and confirmed that it was a significant predictor of moral vitalism when 359 
controlling for socio-demographics. This model explained 34.87% of the between-country 360 
variance and 7.03% of the within-country variance. We accounted again for the possibility that 361 
individual-level associations vary across countries by including random slopes into the model, 362 
which did not affect the predictive power of pathogen prevalence, B = 0.379, SE = 0.111, p = 363 
.002 (see Table 2, Model 3). Similar to Study 2, we proceeded by controlling for each country-364 
level covariate at once, although in this case when all country-level predictors were entered 365 
simultaneously pathogen prevalence remained significant, and the strongest predictor (see Table 366 
S5, model 5). Pathogen prevalence remained a significant predictor of moral vitalism controlling 367 
for the Corruption Index (p = .003) and the Peace Index (p = .003), but became a marginal 368 
predictor when controlling for the Democracy Index (p = .057) and the HDI (p = .062). None of 369 
the country-level controls where themselves significant predictors of moral vitalism: Corruption 370 
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Index (p = .387), Democracy Index (p = .164), Peace Index (p = .728), HDI (p = .369). The full 371 
results are reported in the Supplementary Materials (Table S5). 372 
Next, we proceeded with two separate mediation analyses to assess whether moral 373 
vitalism mediates the link between pathogen prevalence and (i) conservative values, and (ii) the 374 
moral binding foundations. We conducted the analyses in three steps (Zhang, Zyphur, & 375 
Preacher, 2008; see Figure S2). Step 1 revealed that respondents were more conservative in their 376 
values if they resided in countries with higher pathogen prevalence than in countries with less 377 
prevalence (B = .197, p < .05). However, pathogen prevalence did not significantly predict the 378 
moral binding foundation in our sample (B = .114, p > .05). Since mediation analyses do not 379 
require a significant association between the independent and dependent variable (Rucker, 380 
Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011), we proceeded with the mediation analyses for the moral 381 
binding foundation as well. Step 2 confirmed again that higher pathogen prevalence significantly 382 
predicted beliefs in moral vitalism (B = .449, p < .01). Step 3 showed that a belief in moral 383 
vitalism was associated with greater conservatism (B = .579, p < .001), and a greater 384 
endorsement of the moral binding foundation (B = .421, p < .01). Including moral vitalism as a 385 
mediator in each model diminished the link between pathogen prevalence and conservatism (B = 386 
.074, p < .05) as well as the moral binding foundation (B = -.075, p < .01). The test of the 387 
indirect effect corroborated that the association between pathogen prevalence and the two 388 
criterion variables decreased significantly after taking into account moral vitalism (indirect 389 
effectconservatism = 0.259, SE = 0.101, p = .010; indirect effectbinding foundation = 0.189, SE = 0.088, p = 390 
.031).  391 
In short, the findings reveal a relatively robust association between pathogen prevalence 392 
and moral vitalism. Moreover, moral vitalism statistically mediated previously established links 393 
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between pathogen prevalence and psychological tendencies associated with pathogen avoidance. 394 
The latter finding provides additional support for our argument that moral vitalistic beliefs help 395 
diminish the spread of infection. 396 
Discussion 397 
Our analysis of archival and contemporary data offers converging support for the notion 398 
that pathogen prevalence may reinforce moral vitalistic beliefs. Two archival studies revealed 399 
that in contexts defined by higher historical pathogen prevalence, people were more likely to 400 
believe in the Devil, the malevolent power of the evil eye, and in Witches who channel evil. This 401 
archival evidence was bolstered by a new multi-national study in which participants completed a 402 
recently developed measure of belief in moral vitalism. Across all three studies we uncovered 403 
consistent evidence that historical pathogen prevalence is related to an increased tendency to 404 
believe that there are forces of evil at work in the world.  405 
We argue that moral vitalistic beliefs are likely to be functional. By providing an 406 
explanatory framework that functionally mapped the infection and transmission profile of 407 
pathogens, a belief in contagious and agentic spiritual forces of evil allowed for more effective 408 
prediction and response to the threat of disease. As reported by Bastian et al. (2015), moral 409 
vitalism is associated with concerns over contagion and contamination and this explanatory 410 
framework therefore discourages contact with those who may be possessed by the forces of evil. 411 
Furthermore, the association between moral vitalism and both political conservatism and ingroup 412 
preference suggests that it may have reinforced anti-pathogen behavioral tendencies reported 413 
elsewhere in the literature. In this way, moral vitalistic beliefs may represent a psychological 414 
mechanism that conferred an adaptive advantage within environments characterized by a high 415 
pathogen load. 416 
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We argue that our lay explanatory account contributes to the literature in several ways. 417 
First, it articulates a psychological theory which may have encouraged people to enact behavioral 418 
strategies that functioned to manage the infection threat of pathogens. A theory of evil forces 419 
effectively modelled the interpersonal transmission of pathogens, and therefore motivated other 420 
antipathogen psychological tendencies. Second, it provides a parsimonious account in which a 421 
specific belief system was selected to allow for the emergence of a suite of psychological 422 
tendencies (such as conservative ideologies) which limited pathogen transmission. Third, it 423 
generates a range of novel hypotheses. Prior work has assumed detection mechanisms capable of 424 
identifying pathogen threats (e.g., Schaller & Park, 2011), yet effective threat detection in 425 
humans is improved in the presence of a theory (lay or scientific) on which to base prediction 426 
and response. Our work suggests that moral vitalism provided a pre-germ-theory explanation that 427 
assisted in guiding response to pathogen threat. Finally, it goes beyond prior work (e.g., 428 
Murdock, 1980) which examined explicit explanations limited to understanding illness by 429 
focusing instead on a general tendency to believe in the existence of evil forces. This provides 430 
insight into avenues through which pathogen threat may have motivated and reinforced belief 431 
systems with broader social implications. 432 
Our argument that disease threat encouraged development of lay theories that facilitated 433 
or cognitively justified evolved responses is consistent with theorizing within other domains. For 434 
instance, some have argued that a belief in moralizing Gods emerged to facilitate cooperation 435 
and reciprocity within human groups (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Understood as such, lay 436 
theories may not be necessary for adaptive behavioral responses to emerge, but their presence 437 
likely reinforces, constrains, and encourages such responses. 438 
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Although a reliance on moral vitalism as an explanation for illness would have been 439 
especially apparent when scientific explanations were unavailable, such thinking remains evident 440 
in many modern societies, wherein health complaints are sometimes attributed to the will of God 441 
or the work of the Devil (Hamdy, 2009; Legare & Gelman, 2008) and spiritual remedies persist 442 
(e.g., faith healing, spiritual healing, Reiki). Just as religion has remained attractive in view of 443 
scientific advances in evolutionary theory, we suggest moral vitalism has remained attractive due 444 
to its capacity to moralize illness (i.e., explain why people become ill) compared to biological 445 
models that primary explain how (i.e., via transmission and infection). Furthermore, once a belief 446 
is embedded, it tends to diffuse across generations in a culture – a process referred to as cultural 447 
transmission (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981) – thus providing additional explanation for 448 
the persistence of moral vitalistic beliefs. 449 
A strength of the current studies is that they draw on ecological measures of naturalistic 450 
contexts, yet this also limits the capacity to draw causal inferences or to rule out third variables 451 
and alterative explanations. Nonetheless we see good reason to have confidence in our analyses. 452 
First, the nature of our key variables strongly suggests a causal picture; it is unlikely that belief in 453 
evil forces increased pathogen load. Second, reverse mediation models provide less statistical 454 
evidence for antipathogen psychological tendencies as predicting moral vitalism (see 455 
Supplementary materials for full discussion and analysis). Third, we controlled for a wide range 456 
of potential third variables in our analyses. Fourth, other potential explanations suggest only a 457 
palliative function: disease outbreaks could heighten death anxiety, reduce psychological control, 458 
or represent an attributional challenge making morality-based afterlife beliefs and a belief in all 459 
powerful and moralizing Gods more attractive (e.g. Hafer, 2000; Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke, 460 
2012; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). Yet, these explanations do not model the 461 
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potential spread of pathogens in the same way that a belief in moral vitalism does. It is the more 462 
specific belief in contagious and contaminating evil forces that provides a functionally equivalent 463 
framework for predicting and therefore controlling the spread of disease. This interpretation is 464 
buttressed by our mediation analysis in Study 3 showing that increased endorsement of moral 465 
vitalism is in turn related to other psychological tendencies believed to limit the spread of 466 
infection. Prior evidence shows that such forces are understood to exist independently of people 467 
(such as in the case of the Devil) but can contaminate both the body and the mind (such as in the 468 
case of intentional transferal through the evil eye or by Witches; see Bastian et al., 2015). By 469 
providing a pre-germ-theory framework from which to predict contagion and contamination, 470 
moral vitalistic beliefs would have been specifically useful in protecting against the spread of 471 
infection. 472 
There are several noteworthy considerations to our findings. First, explaining illness with 473 
evil is consistent with evidence that people often seek to treat those who are ill, and does not 474 
suggest they would have been ostracized or avoided under all circumstances (e.g., Shweder et al., 475 
1997). Indeed, interventions such as those relied on by witchdoctors, but also current day 476 
spiritual healers, assume negative energy or evil forces which need to be acted upon and treated. 477 
Second, recent work by Tybur et al. (2015) suggests that sexual strategies played a central role in 478 
reinforcing socially conservative attitudes that promoted monogamous pair bonds. We see our 479 
account as consistent with this possibility. As noted by Bastian et al. (2015), a belief in moral 480 
vitalism is associated with concerns over purity of behavior and mental content, suggesting that 481 
it may have reinforced sanctioned behavioral standards associated with sexual conduct. Finally, 482 
while we did not account for phylogenetic closeness between cultures in Study 2 and 3, we did 483 
so in Study 1 by drawing on the SCCS data set which was specifically designed to overcome this 484 
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problem. We also note, however, that phylogenetic closeness mostly impacts on interpreting 485 
evidence for the emergence of cultural traits, as opposed to their persistence (see Thornhill & 486 
Fincher, 2013). Our argument is consistent with both possibilities; that moral vitalism emerged 487 
due to pathogen threat or was merely reinforced within these contexts, thus limiting the impact of 488 
this potential confound.  489 
In conclusion, our findings represent a novel perspective on the manner in which 490 
pathogens may shape human cognition. While previous attempts have focused on how this 491 
ecological variable shapes broad beliefs and intergroup behavior in ways that limit the spread of 492 
pathogens, we provide an analysis of how a pre-germ-theory lay explanation for disease would 493 
have improved predictability and control of disease outbreaks. In so doing, we also provide 494 
insight into how explanations for illness may have shaped or reinforced specific beliefs which 495 
have broader social implications.  496 
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Notes 497 
1. We used a HDI for Taiwan that had been calculated by its government in 2011 (ROC 498 
Taiwan, 2011). 499 
2. The earliest HDI data available for Nigeria was from 2003 and for Macedonia from 2000. 500 
3. This result is based on robust standard errors. When considering non-robust standard 501 
errors, pathogen prevalence becomes a non-significant predictor (p = .128). We used non-502 
robust standard errors for all analyses because a sample size of at least 100 at level 2 is 503 
needed for robust standard errors to be accurate. At the same time, robust standard errors 504 
would be more adequate to consider for the non-normally distributed data (Hox, 2010). 505 
Hence, the results concerning the HDI as a covariate are somewhat inconclusive which 506 
may also be due to multicollinearity with pathogen prevalence (r(45) = -.682, p < .001).   507 
 508 
  509 
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Table 1 
Logistic Multilevel Regression Predicting Belief in the Devil (Study 2)  
    
Model 0   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
(N = 58,076)  (N = 42,482)  (N = 42,482)  (N = 42,482) 
    Coefficient Odds Ratio   Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
  Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
  Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Fixed Effects            
   Intercept 0.092 1.096  0.025 1.025  0.035 1.035  0.117 1.125 
   Individual-level Predictors           
 
 
Age 
   
-0.008*** 0.992  -0.008*** 0.992  -0.009*** 0.991 
 
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 
 
0.206*** 1.230  0.207*** 1.230  0.217*** 1.242 
 
Religiosity 
   
0.786*** 2.194  0.785*** 2.192  0.827*** 2.287 
 
Conservative Political Orientation  
 
0.026*** 1.026  0.026*** 1.026  0.034** 1.034 
 
Education  
   
-0.081*** 0.923  -0.080*** 0.923  -0.128** 0.880 
 
Social Class 
   
-0.063*** 0.938  -0.064*** 0.938  -0.068** 0.935 
 
Subjective Health 
  
-0.050*** 0.951  -0.050*** 0.951  -0.065** 0.937 
Country-level Predictors 
      
    
 
 
Historical Pathogen prevalence     0.630** 1.878  0.553* 1.738 
Random Effects                       
    Intercepts 1.960***   0.750***   0.624***   0.630***  
    Age          9.00E-05*** 
    Gender          0.017**  
    Religiosity          0.126***  
    Conservative Political Orientation          0.003***  
    Education          0.045***  
    Social Class          0.017***  
    Subjective Health                   0.011***   
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001(two-tailed), k = 46 countries. All predictors are grand-mean centred and unit-specific results with non-robust standard 
errors are reported. Regression coefficients are log-odds. The reported odds ratios indicate the changes in odds as a result of a one-unit change in the predictor 
variable, holding all other predictor variables constant. Design weights were used as provided by the World Value Survey. 
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Table 2 
Multilevel Regression Predicting Belief in Moral Vitalism (Study 3) 
  Model 0   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Fixed Effects B SE  B SE   B SE  B SE 
 Intercept 3.831*** 0.113 
 3.815*** 0.106  3.888*** 0.095  3.883*** 0.091 
 Individual-level Predictors 
           
  Age    -0.006 0.004  -0.006 0.004 
 -0.005 0.004 
  Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)    0.097* 0.042  0.097* 0.042 
 0.095 0.050 
  Religion (0 = no, 1 = yes)    0.524*** 0.042  0.524*** 0.041 
 0.497*** 0.016 
  Conservative economic political orientation   0.002 0.014  0.002 0.014 
 -2.00E-04 0.016 
  Conservative social political orientation    0.064*** 0.013  0.064*** 0.013 
 0.067*** 0.017 
 Country-level Predictors    
 
  
 
  
 
 
    Historical Pathogen prevalence             0.445** 0.142   0.379** 0.111 
Random effects           
  Residuals 1.053 
  0.970   0.979   0.949  
  Intercepts 0.347***   0.304***   0.226***   0.211***  
  Age          3.000E-05  
  Gender          0.019  
  Religiosity          0.037*  
  Conservative economic political orientation          0.002  
    Conservative social political orientation                   0.003   
 Variance explained (%) 
          
 
 
 Individual-level -   7.882   7.028 
  9.877  
    Country-level -     12.392     34.870     39.193   
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed). All predictors are grand-mean centred and results with non-robust standard errors are reported. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot showing the correlation between historical pathogen prevalence and belief 
in moral vitalism (Study 3).  
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